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NOTES AND COMMENTS
bargaining may have been encouraged by the willingness of the Fifth
Circuit to set aside N.L.R.B. orders.0 7 Although that court has secured
compliance by using its contempt power to mediate, 8 it is possible that
a sympathetic approach toward the statutory obectives and a stiffening
of the contempt penalties might have a more constructive effect upon
the willingness of Southern textile employers to bargain collectively.
(4) The discretionary injunction power of the General Counsel 9
might be used to secure the compliance with national policy of especially
recalcitrant employers in the region. The speed of injunction could
help offset the deadly effects of long 'delays, often destructive of col-
lective bargaining, regardless of the final legal outcome.70
M. H. Ross.
Pleadings-General Allegation of Negligence-
Sufficiency Against Demurrer
There has been much confusion in the North Carolina courts con-
cerning the necessary requirements of complaints1 to withstand demurrer
for failure to state a cause of action2 in actions for negligence. In the
recent case of Davis v. Rhodes,3 an action for wrongful death, complaint
alleged "that defendant unlawfully, recklessly, and negligently struck
and collided" with the motor scooter on which the intestate was riding.
Defendant answered, denying negligence. Thereafter, plaintiff was
allowed to amend his complaint. This amendment, filed more than one
year after the death of the intestate, particularized the acts of negligence
relied upon. Defendant then demurred to the original complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, and moved to dismiss the action as the
amendment was filed more than one year after the death of the intes-
tate.4 The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action;
7 N.L.R.B. petition for writ of certiorari, p. 13, N.L.R.B. v. Atlanta Metallic
Casket Co., 173 F. 2d 758 (5th Cir. 1949).
" N.L.R.B. v. Corsicana Cotton Mills, 178 F. 2d 344 (5th Cir. 1949), 178 F.
2d 347 (5th Cir. 1949), 179 F. 2d 234 (5th Cir. 1950). Court allowed employer
to escape contempt penalty but kept case on docket and read transcripts of nego-
tiations, noting results of its mediation in later opinions.
81 61 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. §160j (Supp. 1947).
70 MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 119 (1950);
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORT 6TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION TWUA-CIQ 33 (1950)
(court rulings are often "hollow victories"). Se2 footnote 30, supra, for length
of delays.
' A complaint must contain a plain and concise statement of the facts consti-
tuting a cause of action. N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-122 (1943).
'Defendant may demur to the complaint when it appears upon the face thereof
that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-127 (1943).
3 231 N. C. 71, 56 S. E. 2d 43 (1949).
4 N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943) (... action . . . to be brought within one
year after such death). Where the original complaint does not state a cause of
action, an amendment, if it be good and available, would relegate the plaintiff to
19501
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plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court, with Justice Barnhill writing the opinion for a
unanimous court, held that the original complaint constituted a defective
statement of a good cause of action, and that the defendant's remedy,
after answer, was not by demurrer, but by motion to make more definite.
The principle that a complaint which states a good cause of action in
a defective manner is not subject to demurrer is well established in the
North Carolina courts, but its application to the complaint in the instant
case is not consistent with its application in the past, and is inconsistent
with other established rules of pleading in our courts.
For purposes of demurrer, the complaint alleged only that the de-
fendant collided with the rear of the vehicle on which the intestate was
riding, the averments of negligence, recklessness, and unlawfulness be-
ing conclusions of fact or law and not admitted by demurrer.5 Applying
to these allegations the oft quoted maxim that "the allegations in a
complaint do not constitute a cause of action for the want of some
essential averment," 6 it can be seen that no facts are stated which give
rise to a cause of action. An essential element of an action for negli-
gence is the breach of some duty.7 The above allegations possibly imply
a duty to use due care, but they neither state nor imply facts indicating
a breach of this duty. Negligence is not presumed from the mere fact
that the intestate was killed, or that there was a collision. 8 The North
Carolina Supreme Court has consistently refused to sustain a complaint
against demurrer which did not contain facts showing a duty and breach
thereof.9
the position of having thereby for the first time stated a cause of action against
the demurring defendants, and the fact that the action now sought to be main-
tained on the amended complaint originated more than one year after the death
of the intestate can be taken advantage of by demurrer. George v. Atlanta and
Charlotte Airline Ry., 210 N. C. 58, 185 S. E. 431 (1936); Webb v. Eggleston,
228 N. C. 574..46 S. E. 2d 700 (1948).
1 The office of demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleadings, admitting
for the purpose the truth of the allegations of fact contained therein, and ordinarily
relevant inferences of fact necessarily deducible therefrom are also admitted, but
the principle does not extend to admissions of conclusions or inferencs of law.
Ferrell v. Worthington, 226 N. C. 609, 39 S. E. 2d 812 (1946); Newton v.
Chason, 225 N. C. 204, 34 S. E. 2d 70 (1945) ; Smith v. Smith, 225 N. C. 189, 34
S. E. 2d 148 (1945).
' Conley v. Richmond & D. R. R., 109 N. C. 692, 14 S. E. 303 (1891). That
the pleader must allege all the material ultimate facts upon which his cause of
action is based has become axiomatic. If all such facts are not alleged a de-
murrer will be sustained. Ledwell v. Proctor, 221 N. C. 161, 19 S. E. 2d 234
(1942).
'Rountree v. Fountain, 203 N. C. 381, 166 S. E. 329 (1932) ; Taylor v. Sea-
board Air Line Ry., 145 N. C. 400, 59 S. E. 129 (1907) ; Thomason v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 142 N. C. 318, 55 S. E. 205 (1906).
1 Rountree v. Fountain, 203 N. C. 381, 166 S. E. 329 (1932) ; Swainey v. Great
A. & P. Co., 202 N. C. 272. 162 S. E. 557 (1932) ; Burke v. Carolina Coach Co.,
198 N. C. 8, 15D S. E. 636 (1929).
'Harris v. Winston-Salem Southbound Ry., 220 N. C. 698, 18 S. E. 2d 204
(1941); Daniels v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 217 N. C. 768, 9 S. E. 2d 388
[Vol. 29
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The practice of sustaining complaints against demurrer when they
contain a defective statement of a good cause of action has been limited
to those complaints which contain, expressly or by implication, some
recital of specific acts which give rise to the cause of action. This
is true of the cases cited in support of the Davis decision.10 This prac-
tice has been applied to actions involving negligence," false imprison-
ment, 2 contract, and many others.
14
The practical effect of the Davis decision is to modify greatly the
former requirement as to what factual allegations constitute a cause
of action for negligence. The omission of the acts giving rise to the
action is not fatal, but is at worst a defective statement of a good cause
of action, which allows any required amendments to relate back to the
original complaint1 5 The net result is to give the pleader in actions
for negligence the privilege of "notice pleading" as allowed by the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure.' 6 This is of great importance to the
(1940); George v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry., 207 N. C. 457, 177 S. E.
324 (1934); Ballinger v. Thomas, 195 N. C. 517, 142 S. E. 761 (1928); Taylor
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 145 N. C. 400, 59 S. E. 129 (1907); Thomason v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 142 N. C. 318, 55 S. E. 205 (1906); Conley v. Richmond
& D. R. R., 109 N. C. 692, 14 S. E. 303 (1891).
10 Presnell v. Beshears, 227 N. C. 279, 41 S. E. 2d 835 (1947) (negligence set
out in detail and sufficient allegation of agency) ; Livingston v. Essex Investment
Co., 219 N. C. 416, 14 S. E. 2d 489 (1941) (allegation that brick were improperly
encased in mortar); Foy v. Stephens, 168 N. C. 438, 84 S. E. 758 (1915) (allega-
tions were sufficient to give rise to action for fraud, but there was no direct
allegation of fraud; held sufficient against demurrer); Dockery v. Hamlet, 162
N. C. 118, 78 S. E. 13 (1913) (sufficient allegation of indebtedness); Eddleman
v. Lentz, 158 N. C. 65, 72 S. E. 1011 (1911) (allegation that judgment had been
assigned "for value and without recourse" held sufficient allegation of payment) ;
Gillikin & Gaskell v. Lake Drummond Canal Co., 147 N. C. 39, 60 S. E. 654
(1908) (allegation that barge obstructed canal) ; Blackmore v. Winters, 144 N. C.
212, 56 S. E. 874 (1907) (allegation of amount of rent, demand, and failure to
pay held sufficient allegation of indebtedness) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Main,
132 N. C. 445, 43 S. E. 930 (1903) (indirect allegation of necessary facts) ; Allen
v. Carolina Cent. Ry., 120 N. C. 548, 27 S. E. 76 (1897) (allegation of defective
brake).
' See note 9 supra; Cunningham v. Hayes, 214 N. C. 456, 199 S. E. 627
(1938); Piner v. Richter, 202 N. C. 573, 163 S. E. 561 (1932) ; Lee v. Caveness
Produce Co., 197 N. C. 714, 150 St E. 363 (1929) ; Gillikin & Gaskell v. Lake
Drummond Canal Co., 147 N. C. 39, 60 S. E. 654 (1908); Allen v. Carolina Cent.
Ry., 120 N. C. 548, 27 S. E. 76 (1897); Conley v. Richmond & D. R. R., 109
N. C. 692, 14 S. E. 303 (1891).
12 Brewer v. Wynne, 154 N. C. 467, 70 S. E. 947 (1911).
" Hawkins v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 221 N. C. 75, 18 S. E. 2d 823
(1942) ; Sohmer v. Felton Beauty Supply Co., 214 N. C. 522, 199 S. E. 711 (1938).
" Jones v. Jones Lewis Furniture Co., 222 N. C. 439, 23 S. E. 2d 309 (1942)
(breach of warranty); Eddleman v. Lentz, 158 N. C. 65, 72 S. E. 1011 (1911)(action by sureties to set aside conveyances of insolvent defendant); Ladd v.
Ladd, 121 N. C. 118, 28 S. E. 190 (1897) (divorce action).
1 Bailey v. Roberts, 208 N. C. 532, 181 S. E. 329 (1935); Renn v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 170 N. C. 128, 86 S. E. 964 (1915) ; Eddleman v. Lentz, 158 N. C.
65, 72 S. E. 1011 (1911) ; Ladd v. Ladd. 121 N. C. 118, 28 S. E. 190 (1897).
16 . . a very brief statement, designed merely to give notice of the claim to
the opponent." CLARK, CODE PLEADING §11 (2d ed. 1947); McINToSH, NORTH
CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §346 (1929); FED. R. CIw. P., form 9
1950]
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pleader for two reasons: (1) If, through oversight or lack of sufficient
facts at the time of drafting, the complaint contains only a simple
allegation that "X negligently drove his automobile and as a result
struck Y," this allegation will satisfy any statute of limitations or con-
dition precedent to the action, so that a demurrer interposed after the
expiration of the time limit will not cause the action to be dismissed,
17
and plaintiff may or may not be ordered to amend the complaint; (2) if
specific acts of negligence are alleged, the proof is likely to be confined
to those acts alone,18 but if a general allegation is made, and the oppos-
ing counsel does not object, there will be no confining bounds for the
proof that is later presented, and the complaint can subsequently be
amended to include any acts of negligence which were proved at the
trial."'9 If an objection is made, it will not be fatal, but will only
necessitate an amendment.
There was no indication in the Davis decision as to how far the
Court was prepared to extend this privilege of "notice pleading," but
in view of the unequivocal position taken by the Court in -dealing with
other types of action,2 it appears that the pleader in the future should
not rely on this precedent except in actions involving negligence.
Whether the decision will apply to actions other than those for negli-
gent wrongful death will be determined only by subsequent cases.
RIcHARD D-Y. MANNING.
(... defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff . . . ) ; Wat-
son v. World of Mirth Shows, 4 F. R. D. 31 (S. D. Ga. 1944) (... to state a
cause of action for negligence it is only necessary to allege that defendant acted
negligently and as a result plaintiff was injured).
17 Renn v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 170 N. C. 128, 86 S. E. 964 (1915) ; Lefler
v. Lane, 170 N. C. 181, 86 S. E. 1022 (1915); Dockery v. Hamlet, 162 N. C.
118, 78 S. E. 13 (1913) ; Lassiter v. Norfolk & C. R. R., 136 N. C. 89, 48 S. E.
642 (1904) : Ladd v. Ladd, 121 N. C. 118, 28 S. E. 190 (1897).8 McCoy v. Carolina Cent. Ry., 142 N. C. 383, 387, 55 S. E. 270, 272 (1906).
cc.. proof without allegation is as unavailing as allegation without proof." In-
gold v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 230 N. C. 142, 52 S. E. 2d 366 (1949) ; Stafford v.
Yale, 228 N. C. 220, 44 S. E. 2d 872 (1947).
29 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-168 (1943); Deligny v. Tate Furniture Co., 170 N. C.
189, 86 S. E. 980 (1915).
20 See notes 6 and 9 supra. In one subsequent decision, Steel v. Locke Cotton
Mills, 231 N. C. 636, 58 S. E. 2d 620 (1950), an action for mandamus by a stock-
holder for payment of preferred dividends, complaint alleged surplus and net
profits available for dividends on January 1, 1949, but did not allege such surplus
and profits at date of commencement of action. Demurrer for failure to state a
cause of action was sutained, the court holding that "a fact essential to a cause
of action is not alleged when it is only to be inferred as a conclusion from other
facts specifically averred, which are not inconsistent with the opposite conclusion."
[Vol. 2
